Regular readers of this blog will know that there is a panic-stricken desperation within certain sectors of South African academia to pretend that the Boer invasion of Natal was not a ‘real’ invasion. This is, of course, only done to maintain to Apartheid-era fiction of the Boer republics being the innocent victims in the war they started – which shows just how disingenuous and insidious these so-called ‘academics’ are. If they had the integrity to admit the truth of the invasion of Natal, then the rest of their comfort blanket of myths come tumbling down.
We have smashed the self-serving myth of the ‘defensive invasion’ dozens of times already, and if anyone is still stupid enough to think that looting and ransacking 150 miles into someone else’s country is not a ‘real’ invasion, then nothing is ever going to get them to remove their National Party issue blinkers. For those with keener intellects and more open-minds, however, the following maps might be interesting:

As the map makes clear, it is always worth noting that the first significant action of the invasion, the Battle of Talana Hill, was not fought until 20 October, or D+9 (ie. fully nine days after General Joubert’s Boers invaded Natal). This alone should be enough to prove that there were no British forces ‘massing on the border’.
Even after the British defeat at Nicholson’s Nek on 30 October (D+19), additional troops and – crucially – six Royal Navy guns made it into Ladysmith before the town was finally cut off on 2 Nov (D+22). Republican forces also demonstrated against Colenso that same day, prompting the withdrawal of the out-gunned Durban Light Infantry, who had dug in to defend the bridges there:

Of course, getting bogged down in a lengthy (and, ultimately, completely unsuccessful) siege was the exact opposite of what Smuts’ invasion plans called for, and every day the invading Boers spent dilly-dallying at Ladysmith was a Godsend to the hard-pressed, and still greatly outnumbered, Imperial garrison. Seemingly more interested in looting sprees and renaming Newcastle and Dundee, however, it is remarkable that the invading Boers wasted a whole week before trying to storm Ladysmith: an attempted assault which was swatted away by the garrison with contemptuous ease. No wonder this battle is barely known today – it simply does not fit the Apartheid regime narrative of the war.
His forces having proved to be incapable of taking Ladysmith by storm, Joubert was persuaded to leave the undefeated, division-sized, garrison in his rear, and push on towards Durban regardless:

Even then, Joubert’s drive to the coast only began on 13 November (D+33) – four days after the Boer defeat on 9 November, and an incredible 14 days after their victory at Nicholson’s Nek. This dithering had permitted additional Imperial reinforcements to be rushed to Natal, meaning Estcourt and Mooi River were by then both held by almost brigade-sized forces. Furthermore, both Pietermaritzburg and Durban were defended by scratch forces, with the latter also covered by the devastating firepower of the Royal Navy by this point, meaning any attempt to rush the port town would have been blasted to smithereens.
The inconclusive Battle of Willow Grange was fought in the early hours of 23 November (D+44), with republican scouts probing towards Nottingham Road the same day. Also on 23 November, about 50 miles over to the east, a Boer attempt to break through at Tugela Ferry was defeated by the Umvoti Mounted Rifles. More than six weeks after they invaded, and after an advance of 150 miles from their start line, these events marked the high water mark of the republican invasion of Natal. Joubert, who had been injured in a fall from his horse, finally realised he had missed his chance, and ordered his loot-laden forces to retreat to the Tugela.
Despite the latter-day myths of Boer martial brilliance, the republican invasion of Natal was thus an abject failure, and – thanks to the glacial speed of Joubert’s advance and the bulldog-spirit of the garrison – Durban was never seriously threatened. But, as these maps make abundantly clear, it was most certainly not a ‘defensive’ invasion, or a ‘pre-emptive’ invasion. Indeed, it was only because it was so comprehensively thwarted by the outnumbered and ill-prepared British and Natalian forces, that latter-day propagandists were able to convince simple-minded folk that it was an entirely innocent endeavour.

6 Comments
As per his son’s biography on his father it was Smuts’s intention to take the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town to prevent further landing of British troops and then to sue for peace. He was against a protracted war full realizing that it would be bloody, costly and futile tor the Boers. Thus the strategy was a invasion and not simply a pre emptive defence strike action.
Yes indeed. He also summed up the strategy by stating: ‘Whether we conquer or whether we die … Then it shall be from the Zambesi to Simon’s Bay: Africa for the Africander.’
What is more, on 4 September 1899 – about 5 weeks before the Boers attacked the British Empire, Smuts penned this secret memorandum which should leave no one in any doubt as to the aims and intentions of the republics:
‘South Africa stands on the eve of a frightful blood-bath out of which our Volk shall come … either as … hewers of wood and drawers of water for a hated race, or as victors, founders of a United South Africa, of one of the great empires of the world … an Afrikaans republic of South Africa stretching from Table Bay to the Zambezi’.
Struggling to see anything ‘defensive’ in any of that…
Perhaps the Boer supporters should look to The German Blitzkrieg as an example of what Smuts and his fellow Generals should have been planning in October 1899. They could even have used the demise of Napoleon and his endeavours against Russia 87 years before to realise what it takes to initiate attack that would pave the pathway to the sea ports of Durban and Cape Town.
Smuts and his time at Cambridge University must surely have been able to discuss South African affairs in line with British affairs over previous years to better understand the enemy he chose to pick a fight with. Sun Tzu immediately comes to mind as a fairly useful starting point or indeed Von Clausewitz.
With all this in mind it must have been rather embarrassing for Smuts to have to discuss and/or deny his plans for defeat of The British Empire in South Africa.
I do not think it possible that those ‘academics’ who still desperately peddle the ‘defensive invasion’ myth can really be stupid enough to actually believe it. It is simply something they have to keep spewing out, as – if they don’t – then their whole house-of-cards rubbish of Boer innocence collapses. Such dishonesty – rather than simple ignorance – is surely worse.
One wonders if Joubert did not dally on purpose ?
He had NO time for that old rascal Kruger or much for “slim Jannie” Smuts
He was also not much in favour of the war
Smuts had also prepared a strategy for guerilla warfare
See book by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick
The idea was to tie down the British forces long enough for the war to start costing the British exchequer
Then sue for peace on favourable terms – the continued independence of the two Boer republics
Yes, it’s a good point. Joubert was completely opposed to Kruger’s insane attack against the British Empire, and had only ever wanted to take up positions just inside Natal at Laing’s Nek. To say his heart wasn’t in Kruger’s Crackpot Crusade would be an understatement.
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