Peter Dickens – a terrible loss

I never had the pleasure of meeting Peter Dickens, but we chatted almost daily over the last couple of years, and I was saddened to learn of his recent passing. As well as being devastating for his family, his loss will also been keenly felt by those of us who study the Boer War. Peter brought so much knowledge and enthusiasm, as well as an open mind and the courage to call out those fanatics (including alleged academics) who try to defend the myths that still cloud the topic.

A couple of years ago, Peter posted a lengthy comment on an article I had written, and I think his input is so valuable and insightful, that I have decided to post it again here (along with a map I have drawn to illustrate his points):

As I stated in one of my old blog articles, one of the biggest errors in accounting military history is not to consult military doctrine or ignore military science. In reviewing the Boer War invasions the easiest way of dismissing any hyperbole about pre-emptive strikes or setting up advanced defensive fortifications/lines is to look at doctrine.

If your strategy is one of defence – why leave your forts and such formidable natural mountain range defences like the Dragensberg and formidable river defences like the Vaal and Orange rivers (Laing’s Nek worked very well for The Boers in 1881 – why change?) – and then find something else of far lesser defensive value to invest defences and resources into? This does not make good strategic military sense, nor is it consistent with their previous military thinking which gave them victory in 1881.

Then as to the so called amassed “British threat on the border” – in Natal the invasion force’s overall Commander, General Piet Joubert is joined by General de Kock from the OFS and General Erasmus and they advance from their start line at Volksrust for nearly 120 kilometres deep into Natal territory before they meet any significant British forces or resistance whatsoever – the British are nowhere near the “border” and “poised” to invade anything. Nor are they resourced in terms of numbers and equipment to invade anything – and, they don’t have an invasion plan: no invasion ORBAT, no Start Line, no invasion Command and Control, no invasion Orders – nothing (that’s because they had no plans to invade – a simple truth). The British have also rather inadvisably split their already under-resourced forces between Dundee and Ladysmith.

As to continuing a deep advance (remember the offensive plan is to invade), after they are confronted by the British in the field at Talana outside Dundee on the 20th October 1899 (D Day plus 9) – the Boers are initially defeated in two pitched battles, the Boers are held up losing advantage daily.

At this point, extending military supply lines and logistics support for 120 kilometres in 1899 using wagons and horses to initiate a “pre-emptive” strike aimed at the British in Dundee is pure Hollywood, wishful thinking, it has nothing to do with military doctrine or sound military planning – it certainly has nothing to do with the Boer’s overall accepted military plan proposed by Jan Smuts – which called for no investiture in defences or sieges and a straightforward invasion to take Port Natal as quickly as possible.

After winning the battle at Nicolson’s Nek the Boers manage to advance to Ladysmith reaching it on the 2nd November (D Day plus 22 days) – now they are now 180 kilometres into their advance from their start line on the border at Volksrust and nearly a month into their invasion campaign.

General Louis Botha then extends the advance from Ladysmith all the way to Mooi River, and his scouts even probed Nottingham Road on the 23rd November 1899 (D Day plus 44) – 100 Km away from Ladysmith and 60 km from Pietermaritzburg and now a staggering 280 km from their start line. That’s the length of the “supply” line for the Boers – their “high water” mark. No military commander in his right mind sets up a “defensive position” with a near 300 km long supply line running through enemy territory intended to support ‘defences’ – no military commander in 1899 advances near 300 km on horseback for a pre-emptive strike either – air warfare has not been invented yet and even by today’s standards a ground force invasion 300 km into enemy territory is never considered by any commander as a mere “strike” – pre-emptive or otherwise. 

The Boer high-water mark is only obtained by the 23nd November – D Day plus 44 days – now having been significantly compromised on mobility and speed. Both HMS Terrible and HMS Powerful had arrived in Durban port by the 6th November 1899, either one of these two Battle Cruisers had more fire power on board than the entire Boer invading armies combined – a Battle Cruiser defending a port from mounted infantryman on horseback is no match, and it’s what the Royal Navy are trained for and are very good at … also, 44 days into an invasion hardly qualifies a “pre-emptive strike” in that it in no way meets the military definitions and parameters of one as set out by the Caroline test.

The Boer invasion falters, it fails because they had lost their only significant advantage – mobility, aggression and speed gives way to cautiousness and widespread ill-discipline and looting, they chose resource draining static warfare instead – sieges and invest into them instead, losing valuable days and sacrificing their “Blitzkreig” offensive plan altogether. Simply put, the ‘schwerpunkt’ of Smuts’ battle plan is inadequately invested in as limited resources are directed away from the critical focus point and ineffectively deployed in other sieges and other invasions of little military value. Leaving Jan Smuts’ in total disbelief calling General Piet Joubert “passé” and “hopelessly incompetent”.

Realising Smuts’ Blitzkreig invasion plan had failed completely, what happens next is a series of defensive battles as the invading Boers forces form defensive boxes to try and link up with their forces encircling Ladysmith for an effective counter-attack. Standard military doctrine used by countless military commanders before and after the Boer War. This plan of retreat, link up and counter offensive fails at the Battle of Tugela Heights.

It’s all pretty obvious to anyone who has served in the military to be honest – arm-chair Generals in their Facebook echo-chambers reciting their Christian Nationalist educations and educators aside.

https://www.chrisash.co.za/2024/03/21/whats-sauce-for-the-goose/

RIP, Peter – you will be greatly missed.